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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
harassing and vexatious litigation.44 Furthermore, time was a
crucial factor in the Donovan case. The City of Dallas consid-
ered the runway a needed public project, and the city's extensive
efforts to issue the bonds were within hours of consummation."
It can be assumed that the bond issuance had been scheduled
at a time to maximize its success. 6 In view of these facts, it is
difficult to justify awarding plaintiffs another hearing in a fed-
eral forum.
Congress has endeavored to provide injunctive powers allow-
ing federal courts to protect or effectuate their judgments 7 In
view of the legislative intent set forth in the Reviser's notes,48
the subsequent interpretation in the Tenth Circuit cases,"4 and
the need for prompt and final settlement of disputes, it is probable
that a federal court would have been permitted to enjoin similar
relitigation in a state court. The arguments are as forceful when
made in support of allowing state injunctions. Consistent with a
traditional policy of mutual separation and equal independence,
similar protection should be given final judgments of state courts.
Income Taxation: Capital Gains Treatment
of Lump-Sum Qualified Trust Distribution-
Change of Employers as "Separation From the Service"
The Waterman Corporation established a tax qualified em-
ployee trust retirement plan for the benefit of the taxpayer and
its other employees. The plan did not provide for lump-sum dis-
tributions on termination of a participating employee's service
but, in that event, made his accrued benefits payable as an an-
nuity commencing on his normal retirement date.' However, the
plan provided for lump-sum distributions at the option of the
trustee upon termination of the plan. Later, the C. Lee Company,
an unrelated corporation, purchased 99 per cent of the outstand-
ing Waterman stock and caused a new Waterman board of direc-
44. 377 U.S. at 415-18.
45. Brief for Respondent, pp. 5, 31, Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408 (1964).
46. See, e.g., GElraoRN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 654 (4th ed. 1960);
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 108-09 (1938).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
48. See note 81 supra.
49. See note 32 supra.
1. Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022, 1023 (1959), involved the same
qualified retirement plan as the instant case but it gave a more complete
listing of the facts.
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tors to be elected, which on the same day voted to terminate the
retirement plan. Distributions to beneficiaries were made in
lump sums. In due course, Lee was merged into Waterman, which
continued to employ the taxpayer. The Fifth Circuit held that
the lump-sum distribution to taxpayer was not made as a result
of "separation from the service" of his employer so as to qualify
for capital gains treatment under section 402(a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, and therefore was taxable as ordinary in-
come. United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964).2
Taxation of qualified3 pension, profit sharing, and stock bonus
plans is without prejudice to the contributing employer and fav-
orable to the employee-beneficiaries. Contributions to the trust
are deductible business expenses as made by the employer; yet,
the employee-beneficiary is not taxed until the benefits subsequent-
ly are distributed to him.0 Ordinarily, this deferment results in a
tax saving to the employee-beneficiary.7 In addition, as qualified
2. Four cases have arisen on the instant facts. At the trial court level
in all four, lump-sum distributions were found to be "on account of separation
from the service." The instant case and two others have been reversed by
their respective circuit courts. Martin v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 549,
558 (D. Minn. 1963), rev'd, 337 F.ad 171 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Peebles, 208 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Ala. 1963), rev'd, 331 F.2d 955 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Johnson, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9404 (S.D. Ala. 1963),
rev'd, 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964). No circuit court ruling exists on the
fourth, Thomas E. Judkins, supra note 1, so the trial court's finding stands.
3. The most generally significant criterion of "qualification" is that the
plan cannot discriminate with regard to either coverage or benefits in favor
of employees who are officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compen-
sated. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(3)-(4). See generally on "qualifica-
tion" Graicken, Qualification of Pension, Profit-sharing and Bonus Plans, J.
Accountancy, Aug. 1958, p. 42; Swietlik, Taxation of Distributions From
Qualified Pension, Profit-Sharing and Bonus Plans, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 15-16
(1963).
4. See generally Goodman, Taxation of Distributions from Qualified Pen-
sion or Profit-Sharing Plans, 89 TAxEs 34 (1961); Lindquist, Pension and
Profit-Sharing Trusts Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 33 TAXES
30 (1955); Rothman, Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, J. Accountancy, Dec.
1961, p. 47; Strecker, Taxation of Retirement Provision, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PRon. 67, 70-74 (1962); Swietlik, supra note 3, at 15; Young, Miscellaneous
Problems Involving Suspension and Termination of Pension Plans, 15 W. REs.
L. REv. 667 (1964); Note, 10 CiV.-MAR. L. REV. 490 (1961); Note, 34 ST.
Jonx's L. REv. 249 (1960).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a).
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(1).
7. It is likely that taxpayer will be in a lower tax bracket when he receives
his distribution after retirement. Also, interest will accrue over the period
of deferment on the amount which would have been taxed away had there
been no deferment.
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by section 402(e),8 "lump-sum distributions" received within one
taxable year "on account of the employee's death or other separa-
tion from the service," are taxed under section 402(a) (2) at the
lower capital gains rates.'
"Separation from the service" means from the service "of his
employer."10 The phrase includes the situation of an employee
8.
Certain plan terminations. -For purposes of subsection (a) (2), dis-
tributions made after December 31, 1953, and before January 1, 1955,
as a result of the complete termination of a stock bonus, pension, or
profit-sharing plan of an employer which is a corporation, if the ter-
mination of the plan is incident to the complete liquidation, occurring
before the date of enactment of this title, of the corporation, whether
or not such liquidation is incident to the reorganization as defined in
section 368(a), shall be considered to be distributions on account of
separation from service.
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(e). (Emphasis added.) The Senate Finance
Committee report on this section defined "complete liquidation" as the
"disappearance of the corporate entity by reason of the merger or consolida-
tion of such corporation with another corporation." S. REW. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1954).
9.
Capital gains treatment for certain distributions. In the case of an
employees' trust described in section 401 (a), which is exempt from
tax under section 501 (a), if the total distributions payable with re-
spect to any employee are paid to the distributee within 1 taxable year
of the distributee on account of the employee's death or other separa-
tion from the service, or on account of the death of the employee after
his separation from the service, the amount of such distribution, the
extent exceeding the amounts contributed -by the employee ... shall
be considered a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held
for more than 6 months ....
Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(2). (Emphasis added.) See generally Bush-
man & Buchanan, Separation From the Service, 47 A.B.AJ. 831 (1961);
Eckerman, The Unrationalized Capital Gain Treatment of Lump-Sum Termi-
nation Distributions From Qualified Pension, Profit-Sharing and Annuity
Plans, 7 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1 (1955); Grayck, Taxation of Distributions From
Qualified Pension or Profit-Sharing Plans, 39 TAxEs 84, 86-37 (1961); Hoffman,
Capital Gains Treatment of Distributions From Qualified Pension, and Profit-
Sharing Plans, 40 TAXEs S96 (1962); Sporn, Some Proposed Revisions of the
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code Governing the Taxation of Deferred
Compensation Arrangements, 14 TAx L. REv. 289, 802-07 (1959); Swietlik,
supra note 3, at 19-30; Young, supra note 4, at 721-22.
10. E.g., S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1942) (defining
"separation from the service" in § 165(b) of 1939 Code) (Emphasis added.);
United States v. Martin, 387 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964); Nelson v. United
States, 222 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D. Idaho 1968); Lester B. Martin, 26 T.C. 100,
106 (1956); Harry K. Oliphint, 24 T.C. 744, 749 (1955); Mary Miller, 2 T.C.
293, 301, af'd per curiam, 226 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1954); Edward Joseph
Glinske, 17 T.C. 562, 565 (1951).
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terminating his employment through death, retirement, resigna-
tion, or discharge, but obviously excludes the situation of a simple
termination of a qualified plan."' Mary Miller,12 a 1954 Tax
Court decision, expanded "separation from the service" to cover
the situation of a mass severance of the employer-employee rela-
tionship occasioned by a change of employers. In that case the
employees, upon sale of all the assets of the employer corporation,
continued working in their same positions for the purchasing cor-
poration; the selling (old employer) corporation was dissolved,
the plan was terminated, and the employees received lump-sum
distributions. The court held that there was a "separation from
the service" of the employer, even though there was no termina-
tion of employment, because each worker no longer served his
old corporate employer but served a new one. 3 In addition, the
court held that the lump-sum distribution was made "on account
11. United States v. Martin, supra note 10, at 174; Nelson v. United
States, supra note 10, at 716; Clarence F. Buckley, 29 T.C. 455, 461 (1957);
Harry K. Oliphint, supra note 10, at 749; Mary Miller, supra note 10, at 802;
Edward Joseph Glinske, supra note 10, at 565-66.
1. 22 T.C. 293, aff'd per curiam, e26 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1954).
18. Considerable authority supports the position that a change of employers
constitutes a "separation from the service" if various corporate liquidations
and reorganizations are involved. Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022 (1959)
(the same as the instant facts); Lester B. Martin, 26 T.C. 100 (1956) (X
Corporation purchased all of the stock of Y Corporation; Y was liquidated
and X absorbed all of its assets); Mary Miller, supra note 12. (The Lester
Martin and Mary Miller cases were interpreting "separation from the service"
in Int. Rev. Code of 1989, § 165(b).)
The following revenue rulings, as summarized by the instant court, found
the employee of corporation A to 'have been separated from the service in
the facts indicated:
(1) Corporation A in a Section 368 reorganization transfers for stock
all of its assets and liabilities to Corporation B which in turn transfers
the assets and liabilities to its wholly owned subsidiary Corporation C,
the taxpayer becoming an employee of Corporation C. .. . [ Rev. Rul.
58-94, 1958-1 Cuar. Bns.. 194.]
(2) Corporation A sells all of its stock for cash to Corporation B which
completely liquidates Corporation A's assets. . . . [Rev. Rul. 58-95,
1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 197.]
(3) Corporation A, incident to a complete liquidation, sells all of its
assets to Corporation B... . [Rev. Rul. 58-96, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 200.]
(4) Corporation A, incident to a complete liquidation of Corporation A,
sells the assets used in carrying on a division of Corporation A to un-
related Corporation B, the division employees going to work for Cor-
poration B.... [Rev. Rul. 58-97, 1958-1 Cm. BuLs. 201.] ...
(6) Corporation A, incident to a Section 368 reorganization involving a
statutory merger, sells all of its assets to unrelated Corporation B.
. . . [Rev. Rul. 5s-38s, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 149.]
331 F.2d at 950.
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of" this "separation from the service," even though made in the
course of termination of the plan, because by the terms of the
plan the employee's right to a lump-sum distribution vested upon
the termination of his service of the original employer.14 "The
actions to dissolve the Corporation and to terminate the fund in
no way affected . . . [the employees'] rights at that time to receive
their distributive shares of the fund."-"
The Johnson decision is based on the narrow ground that
there was no change of employers because after the change of
stock ownership and merger, the taxpayer still worked for the
same employer."' Had the instant case involved a forward merger
- Waterman into Lee, rather than vice versa - there would
have been a change of employing corporate entities. The corporate
formality of direction of merger seems an irrelevant and inequitable
basis upon which to deny this taxpayer the favorable tax treat-
ment he might have enjoyed had the corporate reorganization
followed a different course.' 7 The instant court's narrow holding
seems unavoidable, however, without expanding the established
interpretation of "separation from the service" to mean, from the
service "of his employer."'s
Dictum in the instant case, on the other hand, went even
further than this narrow holding, casting doubt upon the validity
of finding "separation from the service" in the change-of-employers
14. The qualified plan in Mary Miller provided for lump-sum distributions
at the discretion of the trustee upon termination of the plan or upon termina-
tion of service. 22 T.C. at 800.
15. Id. at 801.
16. 831 F.2d at 954; accord, United States v. Martin, 337 F.2d 171 (8th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Peebles, 331 Red 955 (5th Cir. 1964); Nelson v.
United States, 227 F. Supp. 712 (D. Idaho 1963); Rev. Rul. 58-99, 1958-1
Cum. Bu. 202. Contra, Thomas E. Judkins, 21 T.C. 1o2 (1959) (alterna-
tively, capital gains treatment extended because taxpayer was actually
discharged).
17.
Why should it make any difference .. which way the . .. directors
walked around the table? The form of corporate reorganization is
determined by many different factors such as a desire to utilize one
corporation's good will in a name, limitation of appraisal rights, or
utilization of one corporation's net-operating loss carry-over. None
of these may affect the financial reality of the transaction. If we are
to follow'the authority holding a transfer of ownership a separation
from service, we should not be put off by the form of the transaction,
but make our decision on the basis of genuine transfers of ownership.
Martin v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 549, 558 (D. Minn. 1963), rev'd, supra
note 16; see Sporn, supra note 9, at 307.
18. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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situation. 9 Because section 402(a) (2) is silent as to corporate
liquidations and reorganizations, the Johnson court surmised that
it "contemplate[s] only a [lump-sum] distribution when a single
employee 'dies or severs his employment'." 2 0 More strongly, the
Johnson court felt that on its face section 402(e)21 accepts for one
year the Mary Miller doctrine that a change of employers consti-
tutes a "separation from service" but proscribes it thereafter 2
The Fifth Circuit's rejection of the Mary Miller doctrine,
which would find "separation from the service" in the change-of-
employers situation, does not appear to be justified by the statute
and its history. Congress apparently was aware of this interpreta-
tion of "separation from the service" under the 1939 Code,"m and
absent an express provision contra, re-enactment of the same
words generally supports an inference of acquiescence in that
interpretation.2 4 The face of section 402(e), upon careful reading,
deals with lump-sum distributions "as a result of . .. termination
of a . . . plan" and not with those "on account of" a "separation
from the service."25 Moreover, the Senate Finance Committee's
report2 on section 402(e) suggests that this provision is not
directed at the Mary Miller doctrine itself but rather at its
mistaken interpretation embodied in a House bill concerning
19.
In other words, after 1954 a separation from service would occur only
on the employee's death, retirement, resignation, or discharge; not when
he continues on the same job for a different employer as a result of a
liquidation, merger, or consolidation of his former employer.
381 F.ad at 949.
20. Ibid.
21. Section 402(e) says merely that lump-sum termination distributions
"as a result of the complete termination of a . . . plan" made incident to
complete liquidations executed in 1954 would be treated as distributions on
account of "separation from service." See note 8 supra.
2. "Apparently, Congress was willing to approve Miller for one year,
for the benefit of the limited number of persons who acted in reliance on that
decision." 381 F.2d at 949.
23. The 83d Congress, in preparing the 1954 Code, appears to have been
concerned with defining the limits of the interpretive doctrine applied to §
165(b) of the 1939 Code finding "separation from service" upon a change of
employers. See H.R. REP. No. 1387, 83d Cong., Qd Sess. A147-49 (1954); S.
REP. No. 1622, 88d Cong., 2d Sess. 289-90 (1954).
24. E.g., Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924); Latimer v. United States,
223 U.S. 501 (1912); Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29 (1892).
25. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
26. The Senate Finance Committee's amendment to the House draft of
§ 402 was enacted into law by the 83d Congress as Imr. REv. CoDE or 1954,
§ 402(e). This amendment was explained as follows:
The House bill extends capital gains treatment to lump-sum dis-
tributions to employees at the termination of a plan because of a com-
1984] 357
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section 402, and that 402(e) does not oppose the Mary Miller
doctrine but, in fact, expands it27 for one year to provide a
grace-period for those who may have relied upon its mistaken
interpretation.2 8 That report's reference to "a substantial change
in the make-up of employees" 9 simply clarifies Congress's intent
to eliminate the possible abuse resulting from the mistaken
interpretation of Mary Miller.o Because this risk of abuse does
not exist if a bona fide change of ownership and control ac-
companies the change of employing corporate entities,3' this
plete liquidation of the business of the employer, such as a statutory
merger, even though there is no separation from service. This was in-
tended to cover, for example, the situation arising when a firm with a
pension plan merges with another firm without a plan, and in the
merger the pension plan of the first corporation is terminated.
Your committee's bill revises this provision of the House bill to
eliminate the possibility that reorganizations which do not involve a
substantial change in the make-up of employees might be arranged
merely to take advantage of the capital gains provision. Thus, your
committee's bill would grant capital gains treatment to lump-sum
distributions occurring in calendar year 1954 where the termination of
the plan is due to corporate liquidation in a prior calendar year. The
purpose of granting capital gains treatment to such distributions is to
avoid hardship in the case of certain plans which it is understood were
terminated on the basis of mistaken assumptions regarding the applica-
tion of the present law.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1954). (Emphasis added.) It is felt
that a careful reading of the Senate Finance Committee's report justifies the
interpretation set forth in the text above and in footnotes 28 & S1 infra.
27. Inconsistent with its view that § 402(e) merely retained the Mary
Miller doctrine for one year is the instant court's characterization of this
section as "the limited extension" of the existing law. 331. F.2d at 948.
28. The Senate Finance Committee's report seems to say that the House
provision opens the door to abuse; § 402(e) closes this door; the door-closing
effect is postponed, however, for one year for the benefit of those who mis-
takenly interpreted the present law (Mary Miller) to be in accord with the
undesirable House provision. See note 26 supra.
29. Note 26 supra.
80. In sustaining its narrow holding, the instant court said that "sub-
stantial change in the make-up of employees" focuses upon "termination of
employment." 331 F.2d at 949. However, later in its opinion the court admitted
that its focus was avoidance of abuse of § 402(a)(2). Id. at 951-52.
31. The instant court suggested that the risk of abuse the Senate Finance
Committee feared could be avoided if "separation from the service" were
restricted to changes of employing corporate entities. Ibid.
It is apparent, however, that corporate reorganizations involving a change
of employing entities can be executed so as to abuse § 402(a)(2); e.g., a large
corporation, without its stockholders losing control of the business, could
periodically acquire a small corporation and merge into it in order to distribute
compensation at capital gains rates. A requirement that a reorganization
involve a bona fide change of ownership and control of the business, however,
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interpretation32 of the Mary Miller doctrine still seems valid.
It should be noted that the taxpayer in Johnson would not
have qualified for section 402 capital gains treatment even if the
merger had resulted in a bona fide change of employing corporate
entities, and the Mary Miller doctrine were applied. Although
there would then be a "separation from the service," the separa-
tion would not have a sufficiently direct causal relationship to
the lump-sum payment. The plan in the instant case,"3 unlike
that in Mary Miller," did not provide for a lump-sum distribution
on termination of an employee's service; absent the termination
of the plan, the taxpayer acquired only a right to annuity benefits
commencing at his normal retirement age. 5 It is not enough,
under Mary Miller, that the change of employers in fact results
in the termination of the plan." Such lump-sum distribution
would be incident to, but not "on account of" this "separation
from the service."
It does not seem likely that the dictum in the Johnson case
will be followed; lump-sum payments "on account of" a change
of corporate employers, accompanied by a bona fide change of
effectively eliminates the risk of abuse of § 402(a)(2) because it eliminates
the incentive to abuse this provision. Of. McGowan v. United States, 277
F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1960). In this case a less than 50% change of stock owner-
ship was held not to constitute a bona fide change of ownership for purposes
of § 402(a)(2).
32. Requirement of a bona fide change of ownership to qualify lump-sum
distributions made upon corporate reorganization for capital gains treatment
is supported by considerable authority. The court in McGowan v. United
States, supra note 31, at 614-15, distinguished its facts from the facts of
Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022 (1959), on the ground that in Judkins there
had been a bona fide change of ownership. See also Harry K. Oliphint, 24 T.C.
744, 749 (1955) (interpreting Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165(b)), where the
court seems to dispose of the assertion that a "separation from the service"
had occurred on two grounds: (1) the taxpayer still worked for the same
corporate entity, and (2) no bona fide change of ownership had occurred. See
Rev. Rul. 58-383, 1958-2 Cum. Bua. 149; Rev. Rul. 58-97,1958-1 Cum. BuLL.
201; Rev. Rul. 58-96, 1958-1 Cum. Bu. 200; Rev. Rul. 58-95, 1958-1 Cum.
BuLL. 197; Rev. Rul. 58-94, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 194.
83. See text accompanying note I supra.
84. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Mary Miller court distinguished another case on precisely this
ground. 22 T.C. at 302.
36. Finding the requisite causal relationship on the instant facts, however,
the court in Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022, 1027-28 (1959) said:
No additional benefits would have accrued to him whether or not the
plan was actually terminated. When 2 months later he received a lump-
sum distribution of his benefits under the plan, in our opinion the pay-
ment was made on account of his separation from the service of
Waterman within the meaning of section 402(a)(2), I. R. C. 1954.
1964] 359
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ownership, will probably continue to receive capital gains treat-
ment. It is apparent, however, that the bases upon which such
treatment is extended or denied under section 402(a) (2) are most
arbitrary. Congress might well re-examine this source of inequit-
able treatment of taxpayers.87 In the meantime, the harsh con-
sequences of taxing at ordinary rates lump-sum payments not
meeting the Mary Miller test can be avoided, even though the
plan has been terminated, by continuing the trust or by purchas-
ing retirement annuities."
Constitutional Law: New York Criminal Procedure
Permitting Jury To Determine Voluntariness of a
Confession Held Unconstitutional
Petitioner was charged with first degree murder in a New York
State court. Under New York procedure the question of the
voluntariness of his confession was submitted to the jury. His
conviction was affirmed on appeal' and certiorari was denied.2
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the consti-
tutionality of New York's method for determining the voluntari-
87. The policies behind the capital gains provision of § 402(a)(2) provide
no justification for the discriminations in tax treatment that have been made
between various recipients of lump-sum distributions. "There is no doubt that
the policy argument in favor of capital gains treatment of 'bunched' income
is as applicable to liquidating payments of termination of a plan as it is to
lump-sum payments on separation from service." Instant case at 954.
It has been noted that capital gains treatment is more favorable than
is necessary to solve the "bunched" income problem. See Eckerman, supra
note 9, at 11. An alternative solution to the "bunched" income problem is
now available in the ordinary income averaging provisions of INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 1801-05 (§ 282 of the Revenue Act of 1964). But Congress evidently
did not feel that this was an adequate substitute for capital gains treatment
under § 402(a) (2)-incident to passing the new averaging provision, in Rev-
enue Act of 1964, § 282b, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 821, Congress
repealed Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(e)(8), ch. 1, 68A Stat. 22, which pro-
vided special treatment of lump-sum proceeds of annuity contracts, but did
not repeal § 402(a)(2) providing special treatment of lump sums from qualified
plans. Perhaps Congressional intent is to specially favor recipients of lump
sums from qualified plans in order that they might be able to provide for
themselves the retirement benefits they would have enjoyed under the plan.
If so, this policy also applies which equal force to all lump-sum distributions
from qualified plans.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1(a)(2) (1960).
1. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 N.E.2d 59, 219 N.YS.d 621,
remittitur amended, 10 N.Y.2d 816, 178 N.E.2d 284, 221 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1961).
2. Jackson v. New York, 868 U.S. 949 (1961).
